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MABUX ARA LNG Bunker Index
Port LNG$/mton MGO LS$/mton Date
ARA
714.50
-18.00
648.00
-6.00
Aug 18
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Port	LNG$/mton	MGO LS$/mton	Date
ARA	714.50	-18.00	648.00	-6.00	Aug 18

MABUX Global Bunker Index

380HSFO$/mton		VLS FO$/mton		MGO LS$/mton		Date
454.33	+0.50	539.94	-0.89	747.59	-3.35	Aug 19

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MABUX Market Differential Index (MDI)

Correlation between market bunker prices (MBP) and MABUX Digital Bunker Price Benchmark (DBP)

All Indexes in $/mton	380HSFO			VLS FO			MGO LS			Date
All Indexes in $/mton	MBP Index	DBP Index	MDI	MBP Index	DBP Index	MDI	MBP Index	DBP Index	MDI	Date
Rotterdam	412	432	-20	472	484	-12	648	643	+5	Aug 19
Singapore	402	443	-41	494	525	-31	634	676	-42	Aug 19
Fujairah	385	476	-91	485	529	-44	713	829	-116	Aug 19
Houston	420	445	-25	480	563	-83	650	700	-50	Aug 19

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Latest News
- 2025-08-19
  Stronger traffic and fuel demand lift Singapore’s July conventional bunker sales
  An uptick in vessel arrivals for bunkering, along with higher VLSFO, HSFO, and MGO sales, drove the increase in the port’s total bunker sales in July. Changes in bunker sales from June to July: Total sales up 373,000 mt to 4.76 million mt VLSFO... Read more An uptick in vessel arrivals for bunkering, along with higher VLSFO, HSFO, and MGO sales, drove the increase in the port’s total bunker sales in July.
  
  Changes in bunker sales from June to July:
  
  Total sales up 373,000 mt to 4.76 million mt
  VLSFO sales up 61,000 mt to 2.37 million mt
  HSFO sales up 261,000 mt to 1.96 million mt
  MGO sales up 53,000 mt to 420,000 mt
  In July, Singapore’s sales of HSFO, MGO, and VLSFO rose by 15%, 15%, and 3%, respectively.
  
  The Southeast Asian bunker hub bunkered 3,651 vessels during the month—249 more than the 3,402 in June, according to preliminary data from the Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore. Average daily sales edged up by around 15 mt to 1,300 mt.
  
  However, total bunker sales for the first seven months of the year were 2% lower compared to the same period last year.
  
  Fuel grade share of total sales in July (compared to year to date):
  
  50% VLSFO (53% YTD)
  41% HSFO (40% YTD)
  9% MGO (8% YTD) Source: ENGINE
- 2025-08-19
  Fujairah bunker sales rebound in July on stronger fuel demand
  Higher sales of VLSFO, LSMGO, and HSFO lifted Fujairah’s total bunker sales in July compared to June, according to data from the Fujairah Oil Industry Zone (FOIZ) and S&P Global Commodity Insights. Changes in Fujairah bunker fuel sales from June to... Read more Higher sales of VLSFO, LSMGO, and HSFO lifted Fujairah’s total bunker sales in July compared to June, according to data from the Fujairah Oil Industry Zone (FOIZ) and S&P Global Commodity Insights.
  
  Changes in Fujairah bunker fuel sales from June to July:
  
  Total sales up by 14% to 629,000 mt
  VLSFO sales up by 8% to 387,000 mt
  HSFO sales up by 28% to 204,000 mt
  LSMGO sales up by 27% to 36,000 mt
  
  Fujairah’s bunker sales increased in July after two months of decline. The port averaged 20,000 mt/day in July, about 2,000 mt/day more than in June.
  
  Sales of the main product, VLSFO, rose by 29,000 mt to reach 387,000 mt in July, equal to about 12,500 mt/day, up from 12,200 mt/day in June. LSMGO sales also grew, rising by around 8,000 mt to 36,000 mt, while HSFO sales climbed by 45,000 mt to 204,000 mt.
  
  Despite these increases, Fujairah’s total bunker sales for January–July were still 4% lower than in the same period last year.
  
  Fuel grade share of total sales in July (compared to the year to date):
  
  62% VLSFO 380cst (66% YTD)
  0.19% VLSFO 180cst (0.55% YTD)
  32% HSFO (28% YTD)
  6% LSMGO (5% YTD)
  0.02% 0.50% MGO (0.04% YTD) Source: ENGINE
- 2025-08-19
  EUROPE: FINCOENERGIES SUPPLYING HVO TO SAIL AMSTERDAM SUPPORT AND HOSPITALITY VESSELS
  FincoEnergies has reported that it will be supplying GoodFuels HVO100 – 100% hydrotreated vegetable oil – to a selection of support and hospitality vessels involved in the SAIL Amsterdam celebration of wind-powered ships taking place in the Netherlands... Read more
- 2025-08-19
  China’s Qingdao port hosts first methanol bunkering operation
  COSCO’s container ship has been bunkered with 210 mt of methanol at Qingdao Port on China’s Yellow Sea coast. IMAGE: Methanol bunkering operations underway at Qingdao Port. China Daily via Shandong Port Group Three trucks were used to deliver... Read more COSCO’s container ship has been bunkered with 210 mt of methanol at Qingdao Port on China’s Yellow Sea coast.
  
  IMAGE: Methanol bunkering operations underway at Qingdao Port. China Daily via Shandong Port Group
  
  Three trucks were used to deliver the fuel to the vessel, Cosco Shipping Carnation, Shandong Port Group (SPG) told China's state-owned media firm China Daily.
  
  The port authority has not disclosed the physical bunker supplier for the operation.
  
  SPG, China’s state-owned port cluster that includes Qingdao, Rizhao, Yantai and Bohai Bay ports, confirmed this was the first methanol bunkering carried out at Qingdao.
  
  “It also marks that SPG has become a port capable of supplying both bio-marine fuels [biofuels] and methanol, signifying a solid step forward in its endeavors to grow into an international shipping hub center in Northeast Asia.” it added.
  
  Source: ENGINE
- 2025-08-19
  Oil edges lower as market ponders potential Russia-Ukraine peace talks
  Oil prices slipped in early Asian trade on Tuesday as market participants contemplated planned three-way talks among Russia, Ukraine and the U.S. to end the war in Ukraine, which could lead to an end to sanctions on Russian crude. Brent crude futures... Read more Oil prices slipped in early Asian trade on Tuesday as market participants contemplated planned three-way talks among Russia, Ukraine and the U.S. to end the war in Ukraine, which could lead to an end to sanctions on Russian crude.
  Brent crude futures fell 7 cents, or 0.11%, to $66.53 a barrel by 0000 GMT. U.S. West Texas Intermediate crude futures for September delivery, set to expire on Wednesday, fell 6 cents, or 0.09%, to $63.36 per barrel.
  The more active October WTI contract was down 9 cents, or 0.14%, at $62.61 a barrel.
  Prices settled around 1% higher in the previous session.
  Following talks with Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskiy and a group of European allies in the White House on Monday, U.S. President Donald Trump said in a social media post he had called his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin and begun arranging a meeting between Putin and Zelenskiy, to be followed by a trilateral summit among the three presidents.
  "An outcome which would see a ratcheting down of tensions and remove threats of secondary tariffs or sanctions would see oil drift lower toward our $58 per barrel Q4-25/Q1-26 average target," Bart Melek, head of commodity strategy at TD Securities said in a note.
  Zelenskiy described his direct talks with Trump as "very good" and said they had spoken about Ukraine’s need for U.S. security guarantees.
  
  Trump has pressed for a quick end to Europe’s deadliest war in 80 years, but Kyiv and its allies worry he could seek to force an agreement on Russia’s terms.
  "A result which would see the U.S. apply pressure on Russia in the form of broader secondary tariffs against Russia’s oil customers (as those now faced by India) would no doubt move crude to the highs seen a few weeks ago," Melek added. Source: Reuters/Investing.com
- 2025-08-19
  Russia Offers ExxonMobil a Path Back to Sakhalin
  On August 15, just as the much-anticipated meeting between President Trump and President Putin was taking place, a development of potentially far-reaching consequences but little immediate attention surfaced in Moscow. President Putin signed an alteration... Read more On August 15, just as the much-anticipated meeting between President Trump and President Putin was taking place, a development of potentially far-reaching consequences but little immediate attention surfaced in Moscow. President Putin signed an alteration to his 2022 decree that had transferred the Sakhalin-1 project fully under Russian jurisdiction, this time supplementing it with conditions for the possible return of foreign companies to the venture. The change carries more weight than the quiet timing suggested. At its core lies Russia’s willingness to signal that U.S. companies — and ExxonMobil in particular — could once again have a place in one of Russia’s most strategic energy projects.
  
  Sakhalin-1 is no ordinary asset. Located on the northeast shelf of Sakhalin Island, it consists of the Chayvo, Odoptu and Arkutun-Dagi fields, with recoverable reserves estimated at 2.3 billion barrels of oil and 17.1 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. ExxonMobil entered the project under a production-sharing agreement in the 1990s, after the fields – first discovered in the 1970s – had been left undeveloped for decades. Commercial production began in 2005, with ExxonMobil as operator. At its launch, the project set a world record in extended-reach drilling, reaching 11,282 meters (37,320 feet) with its Z-11 well back in 2007. The equity structure allocated 30% each to ExxonMobil and Russia’s Rosneft, with India’s ONGC Videsh and Japan’s SODECO each holding 20%.
  
  For nearly two decades, this carefully balanced partnership not only demonstrated the viability of large-scale foreign involvement in Russia’s upstream sector but also withstood considerable geopolitical turbulence. Even the 2014 Crimea crisis, which unleashed the first wave of Western sanctions against Moscow, failed to derail Sakhalin-1, despite widespread speculation that the project’s multinational framework would become unfeasible. Yet what it survived in 2014, it could not withstand in 2022. With the outbreak of war in Ukraine and the far more sweeping sanctions that followed, ExxonMobil announced its withdrawal in March, just weeks after hostilities began, triggering a collapse in production from 220,000 b/d to just 10,000 b/d, grinding to a near halt within months. By April, Exxon booked a $4.6 billion impairment charge tied to Sakhalin-1, underscoring the scale of its retreat.
  
  Exports also crashed. Annual shipments of Sakhalin-1 crude fell from 229,000 b/d before the war to 98,000 b/d in 2022, according to Kpler data. For four straight months — June through September — no exports left the terminal. Flows later recovered to 198,000 b/d but still have not reached the pre-war volumes, as sanctions complicated logistics and buyers grew more cautious. Before 2022, the crude had a diverse customer base, including South Korea, Japan, Thailand, China, and even the United States. By 2023, only India and China remained, with a small volume reaching Pakistan in 2024. Today, China has emerged as the largest buyer, taking in 118,000 b/d in 2025 to date.
  
  This reshaping of trade flows coincided with a fundamental shift in the project’s ownership structure. Putin’s first decree on 7 October 2022 formally transferred Exxon’s stake into Russian hands, ending its tenure as the project’s lead. Exxon had explored the option of selling its 30% stake to Indian partners, but Moscow intervened, seizing the equity and placing it in a new state-backed entity, Sakhalinmorneftegaz-Shelf. India’s ONGC and Japan’s SODECO opted to remain. Exxon, for its part, viewed the forced transfer as hostile and unfair, but had little recourse.
  
  Three years later, Moscow decided to soften its uncompromising stance. The amendment issued on 15 August 2025, reopened the door to foreign participation – but only under strict conditions. Partners may reclaim their shares if they succeed in lifting or mitigating sanctions that constrain the project, securing agreements for the supply of foreign-made equipment and spare parts, establishing new technical cooperation deals, and transferring previously accumulated funds from liquidation accounts into the new operator. In practical terms, Russia is signaling a willingness to reengage with foreign stakeholders, but only on terms that advance its own strategic and operational needs. The timing of the decree, however, suggests that more is at play. Signed on the very day of the Trump–Putin meeting, the amendment reads less like a technical adjustment and more like a political gesture — an overt signal to Washington that Russia is prepared to welcome US partners back into Arctic oil development if the broader climate allows. For President Putin, it amounts to a calculated offering, a card placed on the table to prepare the ground for future negotiations and potential concessions.
  
  Yet even if the American side were to reconsider its involvement in Russian Arctic projects, the playing field would look very different from when they first entered. ExxonMobil’s original involvement rested on a production-sharing agreement – a ownership regime that raised controversies when first introduced under President Boris Yeltsin in the 1990s. These agreements were widely criticized in Russia for granting overly generous terms to foreign investors, depriving the state of substantial revenue and limiting transparency in how contracts were awarded and implemented. By the mid-2000s, only two PSAs remained: Sakhalin-1 and Sakhalin-2. The latter became a case study in Moscow’s assertiveness when in 2006, Putin pressured foreign investors to sell a controlling stake to Gazprom. A revived Exxon role today would come under a new legal and commercial regime, one far more tilted in Russia’s favor.
  
  That said, the significance of such a return could extend well beyond Sakhalin itself. If ExxonMobil were to re-enter this project, it could also signal a pathway back into Russia’s broader Arctic ambitions. In 2014, the US sanctions forced Exxon to abandon its joint Arctic exploration with Rosneft after the discovery of the giant Pobeda field in the Kara Sea. With proven reserves of 130 million tonnes of oil and 422 billion cubic meters of gas (and potentially much more), the find rivaled or exceeded resource bases in the Gulf of Mexico, Brazil’s and Alaska’s continental shelves. At the time, the project’s potential was labelled as transformational. A thaw in US-Russia relations that could enable Exxon’s possible return to Sakhalin could open the door to reviving such ventures, which remain some of the most promising untapped hydrocarbon prospects in the world.
  
  For now, Putin’s August decree is a signal, not a deal. But it underscores how tightly the fate of strategic energy projects like Sakhalin-1 is bound to the arc of geopolitics. The legal structures, the buyers, the flows – all have shifted under sanctions and war. What Putin offered on August 15 was not simply a regulatory amendment. It was an invitation, timed to a pivotal political moment, hinting at how energy remains a currency of diplomacy as much as commerce. Source: Oilprice.com
- 2025-08-19
  Qatar to Supply 40% of New Global LNG by 2030 Amid Geopolitical Tug-of-War
  Liquefied natural gas (LNG) became the key global emergency energy source from the moment that Russia invaded Ukraine on 24 February 2022. Unlike pipelined energy that requires time-consuming infrastructure build-out and contract negotiations before it... Read more Liquefied natural gas (LNG) became the key global emergency energy source from the moment that Russia invaded Ukraine on 24 February 2022. Unlike pipelined energy that requires time-consuming infrastructure build-out and contract negotiations before it can be moved anywhere, LNG can be bought in the spot market when required and move swiftly to wherever it is needed. As increasing sanctions have hit Russia’s previously enormous global oil and gas exports, LNG’s crucial importance to the world’s energy balance has, if anything, increased. Against this backdrop, the centrality of the small Middle Eastern emirate of Qatar in the global energy market has dramatically expanded and is set to do so further. Its position as one of the world’s top LNG exporters will be bolstered as from the middle of next year by the first LNG exports from Phase 1 of the giant North Field East (NFE) expansion project. This is part of a broader output expansion programme that will see the emirate’s LNG production jump from the current 77 million metric tonnes per year (mtpy) to 110 million mtpy by end-2026, to 126 million mtpy by end-2027 and to 142 million mtpy by end-2030. By that time it is forecast that Qatar will account for at least 40% of all new LNG supplies across the globe. The geopolitical importance is not lost on any of the world’s major powers.
  
  Qatar’s geographical positioning between the two great Middle Eastern powers (Saudi Arabia and Iran) and their principal superpower sponsors (respectively, the U.S., China, and Russia) has long required it to play a delicate diplomatic balancing act between the competing sides. However, from around a year before Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the emirate appeared to be veering more towards the China-Russia sphere of influence, given the flurry of new long-term LNG contracts signed with Beijing’s firms during that period. This began in March 2021, with the signing of a 10-year purchase and sales agreement by the China Petroleum & Chemical Corp (Sinopec) and Qatar Petroleum (QP) for 2 million mtpy of LNG. December 2021 saw another major long-term contract for Qatar to supply China with LNG, on that occasion, a deal between QatarEnergy and Guangdong Energy Group Natural Gas Co for 1 million mtpy of LNG, starting in 2024 and ending in 2034, although it could be extended. Several other major deals followed. China and Russia had always thought that Qatar might be predisposed towards joining their bloc, given that the emirate shared its principal gas reservoir asset (North Field, or ‘North Dome’) with neighbouring Iran (South Pars), a key ally of both major powers. This 9,700 square kilometre reservoir was, and remains, by far the biggest gas resource in the world, holding an estimated 51 trillion cubic metres (tcm) of non-associated natural gas and at least 50 billion barrels of natural gas condensates. Following the U.S.’s unilateral withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA, or ‘nuclear deal’) with Iran in May 2018, senior figures from Iran’s Petroleum Ministry and Qatar’s Energy Ministry began a series of meetings to agree a new North Dome-South Pars joint development plan. This made sense, as both Qatar and Iran were founding members of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF), together with Russia, the key customer of which remained China. Information received around the time by OilPrice.com from impeccable security sources indicated that China had been broadly told by Russia of its plans for a ‘large-scale special operation’ in Ukraine months before it happened, not just prior to the 4 February 2022 start of the Beijing Winter Olympics, as many reports have it, as analysed in full in my latest book on the new global oil market order. The implication for Washington at that stage was that Qatar might have been complicit in enabling Beijing to weather the storm of energy supply shortfalls and rocketing prices that followed the 2022 invasion.
  
  That said, Qatar quickly found itself on the wrong end of growing pressure from the U.S., U.K., and France to take a step back from China and to start signing major long-term deals with European countries instead, most notably the European Union’s (E.U.) de facto economic leader ,Germany. Berlin’s intransigence in reducing its imports of cheap Russian gas and oil following Moscow’s forced annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea region in 2014 was widely seen in Washington, London, and Paris as the key reason why President Vladimir Putin thought he could launch the full invasion of Ukraine in 2022 with little or no meaningful consequences for Russia again. Given mounting pressure from these countries on Doha, the end of March 2022 saw the first in a series of strategically crucial meetings for Washington and its allies with senior representatives from Qatar aimed at securing vital LNG supplies urgently for the West. Following one such meeting that month -- between Qatar’s Emir, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, German economy minister, Robert Habeck, and a representative presence by the U.S. – then-U.S. President Joe Biden stated his view of Qatar as a “major non-NATO ally”, as also detailed in my latest book. May 2022 saw Qatar sign a declaration of intent on energy cooperation with Germany aimed at becoming its key supplier of LNG. These plans would run in parallel with, but were likely to be finished significantly sooner than, the plans for Qatar to also make available to Germany sizeable supplies of LNG from the Golden Pass terminal on the Gulf Coast of Texas. QatarEnergy holds a 70% stake in the project, with the U.S.’s ExxonMobil holding the remainder. Following on from these developments, December 2022 saw two sales and purchase agreements signed between QatarEnergy and the U.S.’s ConocoPhillips to export LNG to Germany for at least 15 years from 2026.
  
  So far, Qatar appears to have successfully maintained its delicate balancing act between East and West, albeit perhaps with a slightly greater tilt to the latter in the past two years or so. This has accompanied an even greater role for it as a key ally of Washington’s in highly sensitive negotiations in the Middle East, most notably recently in matters connected to the Israel-Iran conflict. That said, nothing can be taken for granted, as the E.U. found out recently when Qatar threatened to halt LNG supplies to it on the basis of the unworkability to Doha of ‘Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive’, as analysed in full by OilPrice.com recently. Nonetheless, according to a very senior source in the E.U.’s security apparatus, spoken to exclusively by OilPrice.com recently, the E.U.is working on ways to circumvent the application of this directive in certain circumstances, such that it will not be a practical problem for Qatar. Nor will Washington allow this to derail its monumental efforts to finally wean Germany – and the broader E.U. – off Russian gas and oil supplies, the source added. “This sanction strategy against Russia is vital to degrading its financial ability to keep fighting in Ukraine and then to move further west,” he said, “and depriving China of free access to as much of Qatar’s LNG as it wants is also key to making its plans to invade Taiwan more difficult over the long term,” he underlined. As it currently stands, investment in Qatar’s overall North Field expansion project total around US$83 billion, with much of the foreign input to that having come from Western firms including the U.S.’s ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips, the U.K.’s Shell, France’s TotalEnergies, and Italy’s Eni. Source: Oilprice.com
- 2025-08-19
  Trump’s Energy Dominance Runs Into OPEC’s Price Trap
  The return of previously curtailed oil production by OPEC+ members is killing U.S. shale growth, with industry executives referring to it as a “price war” to the Financial Times. A prediction by the IEA of a deep oil glut is not helping, either. The shale... Read more The return of previously curtailed oil production by OPEC+ members is killing U.S. shale growth, with industry executives referring to it as a “price war” to the Financial Times. A prediction by the IEA of a deep oil glut is not helping, either. The shale industry is facing tough times.
  
  “We are not going to be putting any more rigs out until prices get back and stabilise in the $75 range ahead. You will see US production start to drop in the fall and into 2026,” the chief executive of Latigo Petroleum, Kirk Edwards, told the FT.
  
  Yet this contrasts with statements made by Exxon and Chevron, both of which have extensive presence in the U.S. shale patch and both of which have production growth plans for that patch. It also contrasts with a 180-degree turn in sentiment that Diamondback Energy did this month, when its new chief executive saying that the shale industry was “pushing the limits of efficiency”. That followed a warning by the previous incumbent in April, who said that shale oil growth had essentially peaked at the level that oil prices were at the time.
  
  Although rumors of shale’s peak may be premature, there appears to be a consensus that the immediate future does not hold massive output gains for the shale patch. The main reason appears to be, as usual, OPEC+.
  
  “The best way [for Opec] to gain market share is to keep oil prices in the $60s range for several years. This will reduce investment in US shale, Canada, Brazil and oil exploration around the world . . . [it] will force consolidation,” Scott Sheffield, the former chief executive of Pioneer Natural Resources, which Exxon acquired, told the Financial Times.
  
  That may indeed be a good way for OPEC to gain market share, but the problem, at least based on industry reports, is that OPEC can hardly afford to keep prices around $60 for several years. In fact, a report by the Financial Times from last week suggested Saudi Arabia is already feeling the pinch from the oil price weakness, having to curb spending on its diversification plans. The report cited the chief economist of the Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank as saying that “A sharper and sustained fall in the oil price would require a deeper retrenchment in government spending to contain the size of the shortfall and the building in government debt.”
  
  Demand, as projected by the International Energy Agency, is not helping either OPEC+ or the shale industry, either. Per the IEA, crude demand growth was much weaker than anticipated in early 2025, while supply was much higher than previously thought as the OPEC+ group accelerated the rollback of 2.2 million barrels per day in oil production cuts and will have reversed these by the end of September. The IEA forecast demand growth of just 680,000 bpd this year, inching up to 700,000 bpd in 2026.
  
  This state of oil’s fundamentals would lead to an all-time high glut in global inventories, exceeding even their levels from 2020 and the pandemic lockdowns. Now, it is an established fact that the IEA does not always get its forecasts right, and this may be an example of such a forecast. With no pandemic on the horizon for next year, oil demand growth must somehow slow down a lot more considerably than it has so far this year for the record glut to materialize—and both OPEC+ and U.S. shale would need to keep pumping. But at least one of those is not doing that, as suggested by the Financial Times report.
  
  There has been a lot of talk about efficiency gains in the shale space, and, indeed, there have been a lot of these gains taking place. But efficiency gains do have a limit, and it appears that the U.S. shale industry is near that limit. There is also a price level below which production growth simply does not make sense until the balance between supply and demand returns. Indeed, the IEA said in its latest Short-Term Energy Outlook that “Low oil prices in early 2026 will lead to a reduction in supply by both OPEC+ and some non-OPEC producers, which we expect will help moderate inventory builds later in 2026.”
  
  The twist in the oil story hides in the demand side. In every monthly oil market report it issues, the IEA cites EV sales growth as a major factor driving oil demand lower—except this month. This month, the IEA attributed lower demand growth in key markets such as India, Brazil, and China to an overall lackluster economy. That could easily be attributed to the effect of tariffs, of which Trump imposed a generous amount on these key markets. The moment the effect of these tariffs on U.S. shale production becomes palpable, things may well change. Source: Oilprice.com
- 2025-08-19
  MABUX: Irregular changes to prevail in Global bunker marker on Aug.19.
  The MABUX World Bunker Index — a composite indicator tracking daily prices for 380 HSFO, VLSFO, and MGO — showed a slight downward movement on Aug. 18: 380 HSFO: USD/MT 453.83 (-3.18) VLSFO: USD/MT 540.83 (-0.19) MGO: USD/MT 750.94 (-0.74) As... Read more The MABUX World Bunker Index — a composite indicator tracking daily prices for 380 HSFO, VLSFO, and MGO — showed a slight downward movement on Aug. 18:
  
  380 HSFO: USD/MT 453.83 (-3.18)
  VLSFO: USD/MT 540.83 (-0.19)
  MGO: USD/MT 750.94 (-0.74)
  
  As of Aug.18, the MABUX Market Differential Index (MDI) — which monitors the correlation between Market Bunker Prices (MBP) and the MABUX Digital Bunker Price Benchmark (DBP) — demonstrated the following dynamics across the key hubs of Rotterdam, Singapore, Fujairah, and Houston.
  
  • HSFO segment: Underpricing margin remained unchanged in Rotterdam, but narrowed by $1 in Singapore, $5 in Fujairah, and $6 in Houston.
  
  • VLSFO segment: Discounts dropped by $5 in both Rotterdam and Singapore, $6 in Fujairah, and $7 in Houston. Rotterdam’s MDI is approaching a 100-percent correlation mark between MBO and DBP.
  
  • MGO LS segment: Rotterdam maintained a 100% correlation, while the other three hubs remained underpriced. Discounts widened by $4 in Singapore, $7 in Fujairah, and $2 in Houston. Notably, Fujairah’s MDI stayed well above the $100 mark.
  
  We expect Global bunker market to show irregular fluctuations on Aug.19: 380 HSFO – plus 1-3 USD/MT, VLSFO – plus 1-3 USD/MT, MGO LS – plus-minus 1-5 USD/MT.
  Source: MABUX
- 2025-08-19
  Hydrogen’s Hype Is Dead — And That’s Good News
  Let’s start with the punchline: a wave of canceled hydrogen megaprojects is not a disaster, it’s a sign of success. The sector is maturing fast, shedding the glam tours and stick-to-the-basics players who couldn’t deliver, and leaving room for quietly... Read more Let’s start with the punchline: a wave of canceled hydrogen megaprojects is not a disaster, it’s a sign of success. The sector is maturing fast, shedding the glam tours and stick-to-the-basics players who couldn’t deliver, and leaving room for quietly effective pioneers.
  
  The hype bubble burst (and rightly so)
  
  Between 2021 and today, low-carbon hydrogen demand is still tiny—just under 1 million tonnes in 2023 out of a total global hydrogen demand of 97 million tonnes, and mostly still fossil-based. Meanwhile, the Hydrogen Insights 2024 report notes a seven-fold increase in global capacity passing Final Investment Decision (FID) over four years, but it’s still modest: about 20 GW of electrolyzers globally.
  
  In Europe, 3 GW of electrolysis capacity has passed FID, projected to produce around 415,000 tonnes of renewable hydrogen annually. Blue hydrogen, produced using SMR plus carbon capture, has only seen about 400,000 tonnes per year reach FID, while over 1.4 million tonnes per year of planned blue hydrogen projects have been cancelled. That’s the smell of bad economics: big ideas that didn’t survive the spreadsheet.
  
  But this is good news. Because the projects that are going ahead are better thought out, more grounded in reality, and genuinely contribute to decarbonization where it matters.
  
  Real hydrogen: projects that work
  
  Take Engie’s Yuri project in Pilbara, Western Australia, which passed FID in September 2022. The first phase involves a 10 MW electrolyzer powered by 18 MW of solar and supported by an 8 MW battery. It will produce around 640 tonnes of renewable hydrogen per year, supplying Yara’s ammonia production. It’s not flashy, but it works. The offtake is clear, the industrial demand is real, and construction is already underway.
  
  In Europe, Engie has also greenlit its share of the mosaHYc pipeline project, a €110 million cross-border hydrogen network between France and Germany. Engie’s section passed FID in April 2024, with construction planned for 2025. The project is a key part of a broader 700-kilometer hydrogen transport network planned by 2030.
  
  Looking ahead, the H2Med/Barmar corridor, linking Barcelona and Marseille, is aiming to transport up to 2 million tonnes of hydrogen annually by 2030, about 10 percent of projected European hydrogen demand. The joint venture behind it, led by Enagas, Natran (an Engie affiliate), and Terega, is preparing for FID in 2028 and is already receiving EU funding.
  
  Meanwhile, Hoegh Evi’s ammonia-to-hydrogen terminal in Lubmin, Germany, is targeting FID by the end of 2025. The plan is to crack imported ammonia into hydrogen for the German market, offering prices of $3 to $3.50 per kilogram by 2027, well below today’s European cost of $8 to $10 per kilogram.
  
  Why these projects matter
  
  The failed mega-projects often made no economic sense. They were banking on massive scale, unproven technology, or unclear offtake. Some couldn’t even identify who would use the hydrogen they planned to produce. In contrast, the projects now moving forward are tied to existing industrial processes, ammonia, methanol, refining, steelmaking, where hydrogen is already used and where lower-carbon alternatives are urgently needed.
  
  This is where low-carbon hydrogen belongs: in the hard-to-abate sectors that account for a disproportionately large chunk of global emissions. These sectors have few other options and are often concentrated in industrial hubs where infrastructure already exists or can be easily upgraded and extended.
  
  In these applications, green hydrogen from electrolysis makes sense when powered by cheap renewables. Blue hydrogen, whether from SMR with carbon capture or methane pyrolysis, makes sense where carbon intensity is lower and economics are favorable. For example, blue hydrogen production in Europe ranges between €3.76 and €4.41 per kilogram, significantly cheaper than green hydrogen in most parts of the continent, which can cost €6 to €8 per kilogram depending on electricity input.
  
  These aren’t headline-grabbing numbers, but they are practical. And they’re what the industry needs.
  
  Fewer projects, better projects
  
  Not every hydrogen project deserves to be built. That’s true of any sector, but the hydrogen gold rush of the early 2020s encouraged a lot of magical thinking. What we’re seeing now is a course correction. Projects with no real chance of securing offtake or capital are quietly disappearing. In their place are better-designed, financially sound projects targeted at real industrial use.
  
  That’s not a sign of failure. It’s a sign of progress.
  
  There’s still plenty of ambition. Commodity Insights reports that Europe alone has over 1.35 million tonnes per year of renewable hydrogen projects and over 2.4 million tonnes per year of blue hydrogen in advanced stages of development. But those figures are now based on sober analysis, not hype.
  
  Policy support is maturing too
  
  This wave of realism is being helped along by smarter policy. The European Hydrogen Bank, for example, is steering funds toward projects that can deliver both emissions reductions and energy system value. The EU is also funding key infrastructure like the Barmar pipeline, and national governments, like Germany’s, are backing import infrastructure with billions in public loans. Laying a foundation for other projects to connect on.
  
  Take the German KfW-backed funding of Hoegh’s Lubmin terminal. Instead of insisting on domestic hydrogen production at any cost, Berlin is choosing a cost-effective path that gets hydrogen to market sooner via ammonia carriers. It’s a pragmatic move that shows policymakers are finally starting to understand where hydrogen can actually help, and where it can’t.
  
  A smaller, better hydrogen economy
  
  Yes, the hydrogen economy will likely be smaller than some of the wild projections made five years ago. But that’s not a problem. It’s a feature.
  
  A smaller hydrogen sector that actually works, one that displaces fossil hydrogen, reduces emissions in heavy industry, and relies on sound engineering, is infinitely better than a sprawling mess of doomed megaprojects. This sector doesn’t need a thousand grand plans. It needs a few dozen excellent ones.
  
  Let the bad ideas die. Let the hype cool off. What’s left is something real. Source: Oilprice.com

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